If history is any indication, Russia will struggle to annex Ukraine.

According to him, the Allied forces occupying Germany in 1945 had 89.3 troops per 1,000 people; NATO forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 had 17.5 troops per 1,000 people; NATO forces in Kosovo in 2000 had 19.3 troops per 1,000 people; and international forces in East Timor in 2000 had 9.8 troops per 1,000 people.

Mar 2, 2022 - 12:11 Updated: Mar 2, 2022 - 12:34

If history is any indication, Russia will struggle to annex Ukraine.

Many observers have been astonished by Ukraine's resistance to the Russian invasion, but one expert has cautioned that if Moscow is unable to control the country swiftly, historical precedent speaks ill for Moscow's soldiers in the long run.

In a social media post, Seth Jones, vice president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, wrote, "The Russian force is overextended and in a perilous position if Ukraine becomes a protracted war."
"With 150,000 Russian forces in Ukraine and a population of 44 million, a force ratio of 3.4 soldiers per 1,000 civilians is calculated. With those statistics, you can't hold territory "Jones stated his opinion.

He contrasted the Russian force ratio to occupations following other conflicts around the world, claiming that successful ones had "astronomically larger" force ratios.

According to him, the Allied forces occupying Germany in 1945 had 89.3 troops per 1,000 people; NATO forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 had 17.5 troops per 1,000 people; NATO forces in Kosovo in 2000 had 19.3 troops per 1,000 people, and international forces in East Timor in 2000 had 9.8 troops per 1,000 people.

Analyst and mathematician James Quinlivan wrote in a 2003 evaluation of the RAND Corp. think tank that a benchmark force ratio for a successful vocation is roughly 20 to 1,000.

According to statistics published by Quinlivan, the US and coalition force ratios in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 were just 0.5 to 1,000 and 6.1 to 1,000, respectively.
"Establishing basic law and order requires a large number of troops and police," Jones added. "In truth, the number of Russian soldiers in Ukraine is insufficient to hold any large city for an extended period added, if Russian occupants face a guerilla fight if the Ukrainian government falls, the chances will not be in their favor.
"They'll be at grave risk of being picked apart by militants in Ukraine."

Soviet forces waged a lengthy campaign against Ukrainian insurgents after the end of World War II. Partisan warfare continued through the late 1940s in parts of western Ukraine, but the Soviets crushed most armed resistance by the early 1950s.

US officials have also noted how stretched Russia's supply lines have become even in the early stages of invasion.

As one senior US official explained to CNN, Russia anticipated a fast victory and may have neglected to plan for sufficient resupply of its forces. Supply lines, this official explained, are a "definite vulnerability."

But US administration officials said Monday that Russia was expected to ramp up its operations in Ukraine.

The officials warned lawmakers in classified briefings that the second wave of Russian troops will likely consolidate the country's positions within Ukraine, and could by sheer numbers be able to overcome the Ukrainian resistance, according to two people familiar with the briefings.

"That part was disheartening," one lawmaker told CNN.

Still, a map of current Russian positions shows Moscow's forces have gained control of only a small portion of Ukraine -- a vast country just slightly smaller than the US state of Texas.

In addition, based on previous battles, Russia faces enormous obstacles in capturing Ukraine's urban centers, such as the capital, Kyiv.
"Urban terrain offers incredible resources and advantages for a defending force to inflict disproportionate numbers of casualties on an attacking element, cause the attacker to run out of time in the strategic environment, and ultimately bring the momentum of an attack to a screeching halt," wrote John Spencer and Jayson Geroux for the Modern War Institute at West Point, home of the US Military Academy, earlier this month.

The former US and Canadian military officers, the duo cited battles ranging from World War II to the Korean War, Chechnya, and Syria, in which urban defenders were able to inflict severe losses on their assailants.
With a 40-mile-long (64-kilometer-long) column of Russian military vehicles and armor its route to Kyiv, what Spencer and Geroux say happened to Russian equipment in Grozny, Chechnya, in 1995, could be especially worrisome for Moscow's current forces.

Chechen insurgents attacked Russian armored vehicles from basements and upper floors of houses, employing as few as two men and only guns, grenades, and grenade launchers, they wrote.
"Main tanks and other weapons were unable to return fire effectively," Spencer and Geroux claimed.
"Once in their trap, ambush teams would hit the vulnerable places of Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers, as well as the lead and trail vehicles, rapidly withdraw, and then advance up the flanks to strike the now paralyzed Russian columns again," they added.

One Russian brigade lost 102 of its 120 armored vehicles and 20 of its 26 tanks to Chechen insurgents in Grozny over three days in January 1995, they claimed.
If this example even comes close to describing what the Russian invaders will confront in Ukraine's cities, the conflict will be prolonged.